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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal arises from a final judgment of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Guy R. Burningham presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3 (2) (k) (1992) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In this matter the defendant below, Jordan North ("North"), 
seeks a review of certain findings of fact entered by the trial 
court. North claims the evidence presented was insufficient and 
the findings are "clearly erroneous." 
North notes the standard of review on his appeal is the 
clearly erroneous standard, citing Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 
846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993) and Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431 (Utah 
1993) . However, North fails to set forth for this Court the entire 
standard as stated in those cases. In Alta Industries the Court's 
full statement the standard is as follows: 
A party seeking to set aside a trial court's findings 
carries a heavy burden: "To mount a successful challenge 
to the correctness of a trial court's findings of fact, 
an appellant must first marshall all the evidence 
supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings 
even in viewing it in the light most favorable to the 
court below." [citations omitted.] 
Id. at 1286. Identical language is found in Gillmor. Id. at 433. 
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Plaintiff D. Scott Nuttall dba Nuttall Construction Company 
("Nuttall") has filed a cross appeal. In his cross appeal Nuttall 
raises four issues for review. However, Nuttall will address in 
this brief only the following issue: 
Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a matter 
of law that prejudgment interest is not allowed on this 
mechanic's lien foreclosure claim. 
All other issues raised in the cross appeal are hereby waived. 
Whether prejudgment interest is allowed is a question of law. 
Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion on the question is 
reviewed under a correction of error standard. Herm Hughes & Sons, 
Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P. 2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Warren v. Provo 
City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is mechanic's lien foreclosure action. Nuttall is a 
licensed contractor in Utah County, engaged in the business of 
building and remodeling personal residences. North was, at times 
pertinent herein, the owner of a home located in Utah County. 
Nuttall and North entered into a written agreement whereby Nuttall 
agreed to remodel and make additions to North's home for the cost 
of materials and labor plus ten percent. When North breached that 
agreement and failed to pay, Nuttall ceased any further work on the 
residence, filing a notice of lien on December 13, 1991. 
2 
In response to the complaint, North filed a counterclaim 
alleging that Nuttall had breached the contract and that North had 
overpaid for the work performed. 
This matter was tried to the court beginning on March 9, 1994. 
After two days of trial the matter was continued and concluded on 
June 30 and July 1, 1994. Following trial the court issued a 
memorandum decision dated November 30, 1994. (R. 1221) After 
post-trial motions, the memorandum decision was amended. (R. 1269) 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Nuttall and against 
North for the sum of $85,261.64 together with attorneys' fees in 
the sum of $18,000.00. However, the trial court refused to award 
prejudgment interest on the amount of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
North has included in his brief a lengthy and convoluted 
statement of the facts of this case. For the most part, North 
includes in that statement only the testimony given by North, 
ignoring the testimony of Nuttall and other witnesses. Such a 
recitation of facts is not necessary. The only facts required to 
understand this case are given below. These facts are undisputed: 
1. Nuttall is a licensed general contractor in the business 
of building and remodeling homes in Utah County. (R. 696) 
2 . North was the owner of a home located in Utah County with 
the mailing address of 4545 Brookshire, Provo, Utah. (R. 514) 
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3. North hired numerous other contractors prior to Nuttall 
for the purpose of attempting to remodel and make changes to his 
home. (R. 514-522) 
4. North retained Nuttall to finish the addition to and 
remodeling of North's home on the basis of time and material plus 
ten percent, all in accordance with a written agreement signed by 
both parties. (R. 524; Exhibit 42) 
5. During the course of the job, Nuttall sent frequent and 
periodic statements to North indicating the amount of work 
accomplished, including labor and materials. Generally these 
periodic billings included a draw sheet and actual invoices from 
subcontractors and suppliers. Copies of the billings were 
introduced, without objection, at the trial as Exhibits 1 through 
36 inclusive. (R. 767-782; 798-806) 
6. The total value of all labor performed and material 
supplied to the home of North in accordance with the agreement 
between the parties was $686,396.69. (R. 809; Exhibit 41) 
7. The undisputed amount of payments received from North by 
Nuttall totalled $535,085.61, leaving a balance due of $151,311.08. 
(R. 994-95; Exhibit 41) 
8. Nuttall ceased any further work on the home because of 
non-payment by North. At the time Nuttall walked off the project 
there was much work left to be done and many items were incomplete. 
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Nuttall never sought recovery for these incomplete items, but only 
the reasonable value of the work and materials actually furnished 
to the project. (R. 840) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ample evidence exists to support the judgment of the trial 
court. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-1-3 (1994), Nuttall is 
entitled to the value of the services and materials supplied to 
North's property. The evidence presented to the trial court 
clearly supports an award of $151,311.08. Not only did Nuttall 
testify as to the cost of the work done, various subcontractors 
hired by Nuttall also testified as to their work. Most 
importantly, these subcontractors, without exception, testified 
that the amount charged for the work on North's property was normal 
and customary. This testimony was completely uncontroverted by 
North. 
North has failed to meet the burden imposed on him by the 
standard of review. It is not appropriate for North to simply 
reargue the facts of the case because the trial court disagreed 
with his version. Rather, it is incumbent upon North to first 
marshall all of the evidence which tends to support the ruling of 
the court and then show how that evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Because North has wholly failed to meet this burden, his appeal 
must be summarily denied. 
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On the issue raised by the cross appeal, it is Nuttall's 
position that the trial court erred in denying prejudgment 
interest. The prevailing law is that where damages can be 
ascertained through some objective and fixed standard, and where 
such damages are not, transitory, discretionary or continuing, 
prejudgment interest is appropriate. In this case, the amount of 
damages was fixed as of the lien filing date. Nuttall was awarded 
judgment for a portion of the fixed damages. The portion awarded 
was itself fixed and ascertainable. Prejudgment interest is 
therefore appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: NORTH HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN UNDER THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW. 
North states, at page 1 of his brief, that there are four 
issues on appeal. In reality, however, North's brief deals with 
only one issue. Fairly summarized, North argues (Point 1) that the 
findings of fact are not supported by the evidence and are 
therefore clearly erroneous. North then argues (Point 2) that 
since the findings are not supported by the evidence, the 
conclusions of law are necessarily erroneous. Thus, in effect, 
North makes a single argument which is that the findings of fact of 
the trial court are not supported by the evidence. 
A. North Has Failed to Marshall the Evidence. The controlling 
case law is uniform in imposing a very specific burden upon any 
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party who seeks to convince this Court that the trial court erred 
in its findings of fact. The responsibility of the trial court is 
to consider conflicting testimony and evidence, weigh the 
credibility of the witnesses and exhibits presented and make a 
factual determination based upon what it sees and hears. As such, 
the work of the trial court is given deferential review. See 
Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P. 2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) . 
Given that deference, any party attacking the findings of the 
trial court has a specific responsibility. In order to have his 
arguments even considered, the appellant must first set before this 
Court every bit of evidence which tends to support the trial 
court's findings and then show how, despite such evidence, the 
findings of the court are clearly erroneous. 
In Grayson, the Supreme Court stated: 
To successfully attack a trial court's findings of fact, 
an appellant must first marshall all the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against an attack,.... 
Id. at 470. See also Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 
1992); Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282 (Utah 1993). 
More importantly, the case law is specific in its requirement 
that the act of marshalling all evidence in support of the findings 
is a condition precedent to consideration of the arguments as to 
the sufficiency of the evidence. In other words, unless the 
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appellant has successfully completed the task of marshalling, the 
appeal is to be dismissed without further discussion. 
The line of cases which illustrates this point begins with 
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). In that case the 
appellant attacked the trial court's factual findings, arguing that 
the factual findings were not supported by the record. The Supreme 
Court summarily dismissed such arguments citing the appellant's 
failure to marshall the evidence. On that point the Court stated: 
The challenges to the factual findings can be disposed of 
readily. Erickson makes numerous arguments based on the 
facts as he presented them to the trial court, rather 
than on the facts as found by that court. . . . With 
respect to these matters, we take as our starting point 
the trial court's findings and not Erickson's recitation 
of the facts. To mount a successful attack on the trial 
court's findings of fact, an appellant must marshall all 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. [citations 
omitted] Erickson has not begun to carry that heavy 
burden. Nowhere does he marshall the evidence supporting 
his version of the facts, much less the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings. Under these 
circumstances/ we decline to further consider Erickson's 
attack on the factual findings. 
Id. at 1069-70 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
Similarly, in Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987), the 
appellant's attack on findings was dismissed out of hand because 
the appellant had failed to meet its threshold burden of 
marshalling all evidence. The Court stated: 
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The Court begins its analysis with the trial court's 
findings of fact, not with an appellant's view of the way 
he or she believes the facts should have been found. 
Defendants have not even begun to seriously discuss the 
trial court's findings that dispute their version of the 
facts. In Scharf v. BMG Corp, we explained the duty 
incumbent upon an appellant to mount a successful 
challenge to a trial court's findings of fact. An 
appellant must marshall all of the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings. Only then can we consider 
whether those findings are "clearly erroneous•" Because 
defendants have failed to make such a showing, the trial 
court's findings will not be disturbed. 
Id. at 150 (emphasis added). 
In the case at hand, North has, in the words of the Supreme 
Court, "not even begun" to marshall the evidence supporting the 
findings. A fair reading of North's brief shows that it contains 
nothing more than a rehashing and a reargument of North's version 
of the facts. At no point does North set out all of the evidence 
on any specific factual finding which was presented by Nuttall and 
then show that evidence to be insufficient. 
For example, North attacks the word "changes" found in 
findings of fact 7 and 13. However, at no place in the brief will 
the Court find a marshalling of the numerous references to changes 
which were described by Nuttall and his subcontractors. In order 
to properly marshall the evidence on the issue of "changes", North 
should have, at a minimum, noted the following testimony from 
Nuttall on this issue: 
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1. Additional work in the master suite not originally 
contemplated by the contract. (R. 710) 
2. No bid given for the additional work in the master suite. 
(R. 712) 
3 . Discussions regarding the fact these changes to the master 
suite would result in additional time charges. (R. 713) 
4. Changes to the office on the back of the house. (R. 713) 
5. Changes to the kitchen. (R. 714) 
6. Changes to the entry way. (R. 715) 
7. Further references to numerous changes. (R. 716) 
8. Changes made by the interior decorator. (R. 718) 
9. References to numerous other smaller changes. (R. 718-20) 
10. Reference to the numerous times that Mr. North simply 
changed his mind on work that was being done. (R. 722) 
11. Examples of work that was constantly changed requiring 
"tear out and redo". (R. 724) 
The foregoing is illustrative of the failure of North to 
marshall the evidence as required by the standard of review. 
North's idea of marshalling of such evidence is to state, at page 
19 of his brief, that "Scott Nuttall's testimony is replete with 
generalizations that North was continually changing his mind," 
without even an attempt at a reference to the actual testimony. 
The record, however, is replete with specific instances of 
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testimony given by Nuttall and by the subcontractors, all of which 
was uncontroverted by North or his witnesses. Assembling these 
specific references and setting them before the Court are part of 
North's burden. 
Similar analyses of North's other complaints about the 
findings of fact can be made. In essence, North does nothing more 
than argue that the trial court should not have believed the 
evidence, not that the evidence was insufficient. North lost at 
trial making the same arguments. A retrial of the facts is not 
appropriate before this Court. 
North has failed to meet his threshold burden. North knows 
that if he were actually to marshall all of the evidence on these 
various points, there would be but one conclusion: that the trial 
court's findings were supported by the evidence. On this basis 
alone, the North's appeal should be dismissed. 
B. There is Ample Evidence to Support the Findings of the Trial 
Court. It is not Nuttall's responsibility to show that there is 
more than sufficient evidence to support each of the findings of 
the trial court. However, some examples of the testimony will 
illustrate that the trial court was well within its right to enter 
the findings of fact and to conclude that the plaintiff was 
entitled to judgment. North raises, in one form or another, 
objections to the following findings: 
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1. Findings 7 and 13. Examples of the specific evidence upon 
which the trial court could rely for Findings 7 and 13 has been 
given above. In addition, numerous other witnesses testified as to 
the constant changes and additional work which North requested. 
For example, Mr. Bill Mammen, an architect, testified that he was 
hired to make substantial changes to the second floor of the 
structure (R. 731) , that the changes were done on top of the 
addition to the home (R. 731) , that there were changes to the 
kitchen over and above the addition to the home (R. 732) , and that 
design changes were made to the entry way and to the recreation 
room in the basement level. (R. 733) 
Mr. Scott Wright, a subcontractor, testified: 
Yeah. It was the common idea that when we came down 
there was a change every time we came down. 
(R. 595) Mr. Wright then gave a specific example of the changes to 
which he referred. (R. 596-97) Similar testimony was given by Mr. 
Jerry Nielsen, a flooring contractor (R. 622), by Mr. Eric Hundley, 
a painting contractor (R. 634), by Mr. David Johnson, a carpeting 
contractor (R. 649), by Mr. Reid Erdman, an electrical contractor 
(R. 663) , and by Mr. Russel Necaise, a masonry contractor. (R. 
674) 
2. Findings 8, 9 and 10. Apparently, North claims that these 
findings are not supported by the evidence. This claim is not only 
confusing, but ludicrous. 
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Finding No. 8 states Nuttall maintained records of work 
performed and gave periodic billings to North. The supporting 
evidence is found in the first 36 exhibits, together with Mr. 
Nuttall's clear testimony. (R. 782-794) North's claim that the 
court had no basis for finding that Nuttall maintained records and 
gave periodic billings is nothing short of a mystery. 
Similarly, Finding No. 9 deals, in essence, with the fact that 
North requested and that Nuttall and several subcontractors 
accepted trades in lieu of cash payments. Not only did Nuttall and 
each one of the subcontractors testify as to trades, but North, 
himself, admitted that trades were used. Indeed, North stipulated 
that trade payments were made. (R. 53 8) 
Finally, Finding No. 10 states that Nuttall billed North 
normal and customary charges plus ten percent. On this issue each 
one of the subcontractors listed above, without exception, 
testified that they billed normal and customary charges. (See 
references to the record above.) More importantly, at no time did 
North produce another contractor, another subcontractor or any 
other expert who could speak on the issue of the amount billed by 
Nuttall or who could give an opinion that the amount billed was in 
excess of normal and customary charges for labor and materials. 
3. Findings 16, 17, 14 and 11. In addition to the foregoing, 
North at least mentioned, in passing, Findings 16, 17, 14 and 11. 
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It is respectfully submitted, however, that in his brief North does 
nothing more than to argue against the findings. There is no 
evidence given in the brief to show how any of those findings are 
incorrect. All that North does is to argue either the weight to be 
given the finding or the fact that North disagreed with the 
finding. 
A perfect example is North's treatment of Finding No. 16 on 
page 31 of his brief. There, after setting forth the finding 
(which was to the effect that Nuttall had submitted a bill to North 
on October 30, 1991) North argues: "However, no evidence exists or 
was presented that this letter/exhibit is accurate in any way 
whatsoever." The fact of the matter is that this exhibit was 
offered at trial by North as evidence of what North thought was due 
and owing as of the date of the statement. (Exh. 44) It is simply 
incomprehensible that North, having introduced the exhibit himself, 
would then argue that there is no basis for its sufficiency as 
evidence. 
C. Conclusion. North has failed miserably at marshalling for this 
Court all of the evidence upon which the trial court could rely for 
its findings. Having failed, North is not entitled to be heard on 
his arguments as to the sufficiency of the evidence which he failed 
to set forth. Even if North had met his burden, however, there is 
a massive amount of information in the record upon which each of 
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the findings can be supported. That North disagrees with the 
conclusion made by the trial court is of no moment. Each of the 
findings is adequately supported. North is not entitled to retry 
his case before this Court. The appeal, in its entirety, should be 
dismissed. 
POINT II: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
The trial court determined Nuttall is not entitled to 
prejudgment interest "[b]ecause the amounts awarded were 
legitimately in dispute and unliquidated . . . ." (R. 1291) The 
trial court's decision on this point presents a question of law 
which this Court reviews for correctness. Andreason v. Aetna 
Casualty & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Utah law on prejudgment interest is well established. Whether 
or not a claim is unliquidated or in dispute, prejudgment interest 
should be awarded "in situations where the damage is complete, the 
loss can be measured by facts and figures, and the amount of loss 
is fixed as of a particular time." Id. As demonstrated by the 
trial court's own findings, the test for awarding prejudgment 
interest is satisfied in this case. 
A. The Damage is Complete and Can Be Measured As of a Particular 
Time. Under Utah law, prejudgment interest is generally allowed if 
"the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of 
a particular time . . . . " Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 
15 
P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 930, 97 S. Ct. 
2634 (1977). 
In this case, the damage was complete and the loss fixed as of 
the end of October 1991. The trial court found North decided to 
stop paying Nuttall in October 1991. (R. 1292) North then gave 
Nuttall notice of his decision, anticipatorily breaching the 
parties' contract. (R. 1292) Nuttall submitted his final bill to 
North on October 30, 1991. (R. 1292) When North refused to pay 
the bill, Nuttall recorded his lien on December 13, 1991. (R. 
1292) 
The trial court apparently concluded Nuttall's loss was not 
fixed as of a particular time because North disputed the final 
bill. This conclusion effectively grants any party who might be 
liable for prejudgment interest the power to avoid the liability by 
simply disputing the amount of the underlying claim. Utah law does 
not support this anomalous result. If entitlement to prejudgment 
interest depended on whether the defendant disputed the principal 
debt, prejudgment interest would almost never be awarded since, by 
definition, a lawsuit involves an underlying dispute. 
The law of prejudgment interest is not concerned with the 
parties' dispute. Rather, the proper focus of inquiry is on the 
factors which allow certainty in calculation, such as complete 
damages and a loss fixed as of a particular time. See Andreason, 
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848 P. 2d at 177. If these factors are present, and the loss can be 
measured by facts and figures, it is of no consequence that one 
party disputes the loss. 
The trial court's own findings establish the breach of 
contract and consequent damages were complete and fixed as of the 
end of October 1991. That North disputed the amount of loss does 
not change the date it was complete and fixed. The trial court 
erred in concluding this dispute is the basis for denying rather 
than awarding prejudgment interest. 
B. The Loss Can Be Measured by Facts and Figures. The second half 
of the test for determining entitlement to prejudgment interest 
requires that the loss be measurable "by facts and figures . . . ." 
Bjork, 560 P. 2d at 317. The question is whether the damages can be 
ascertained through some objective, fixed standard, rather than an 
assessment based on discretion or subjective judgment. Id.; See 
also Andreason, 848 P.2d at 177. 
The trial court apparently concluded Nuttall's claim failed to 
meet this part of the test since the claim was "unliquidated . . . 
." (R. 1291) Nuttall respectfully suggests that the trial court 
used the term "unliquidated" in an improper sense. "Unliquidated" 
means "not ascertained in amount." Blacks Law Dictionary 800 (5th 
ed. 1983). As the trial court found, Mr. Nuttall had ascertained 
the amount of his claim by reference to the records he maintained. 
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(R. 1293) That North disputed the amount ascertained by Nuttall 
does not render the amount unliquidated. Nuttall's claim was 
liquidated from the date he recorded his lien. 
More importantly, whether the claim was unliquidated is 
legally irrelevant. Almost 90 years ago the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized "where the damage is complete, and the amount of the 
loss is fixed as of a particular time, there is -- there can be --
no reason why interest should be withheld merely because the 
damages are unliquidated." Fell v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 88 P. 
1003, 1006 (Utah 1907). The Fell court went on to emphasize the 
point: 
The true test to be applied as to whether interest should 
be allowed before judgment in a given case or not is, 
therefore, not whether the damages are unliquidated or 
otherwise, but whether the injury and consequent damages 
are complete and must be ascertained as of a particular 
time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and 
known standards of value, which the court or jury must 
follow in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by 
their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed 
for past as well as for future injury, or for elements 
that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of value. 
Id. at 107; see also Andreason, 848 P. 2d at 177 (noting that 
11
 [a] lthough damages may be unliquidated, they must be calculable 
through a mathematically certain procedure allowing the court or 
the jury to fix the amount . . .") . 
Applying these principles to this case, the second part of the 
prejudgment interest test is obviously satisfied. Although the 
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trial court did not disclose the precise basis for its award, it is 
apparent the court was guided by facts and figures "and known 
standards of value . . . " rather than its subjective judgment. The 
sum awarded, $85,261.64, is specific. An even, rounded number is 
expected if the award can not be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy. 
Moreover, the trial court provides some insight into its 
calculations. After concluding "the sum of $85,261.64 is due and 
owing by the defendant to the plaintiff for labor and materials 
furnished . . .," the court notes "[t]his amount includes all 
offsets for items that the plaintiff did not have sufficient 
documentation to support, and items for which the defendant was 
charged and either did not receive or had to pay to have finished." 
(R. 1291) In other words, the trial court determined the amount of 
its award using mathematical calculations, deducting for offsets 
and overcharges. Nuttall's loss was measured by facts and figures, 
satisfying the second part of the prejudgment interest test. 
C. Prejudgment Interest is Routinely Allowed in This Context. 
Mechanic's lien claims, by statutory prescription, involve a 
particular sum demanded as of a particular date based on 
calculations made from documentary evidence, such as invoices and 
payment ledgers. These attributes lend mechanic's lien claims the 
kind of certainty courts look for in determining whether 
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prejudgment interest will be allowed. Because of this certainty, 
prejudgment interest is almost always awarded in mechanic's lien 
foreclosure actions. 
A recent example from Kansas is J. Walters Construction v. 
Greystone South Partnership, 817 P. 2d 201 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). 
Two construction lenders appealed from the trial court's 
determination that contractors' mechanic's liens had priority over 
certain mortgages. The lenders argued the contractors were not 
entitled to prejudgment interest since their "claims were not 
liquidated until trial." Id. at 208. The appellate court held the 
claims were sufficiently certain to allow prejudgment interest from 
the date the liens were filed, despite the existence of offsets and 
counterclaims. See Id. at 208-10. 
Likewise, in Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., Inc., 713 P.2d 776 
(Wyo. 1986), the property owner appealed the trial court's judgment 
foreclosing a material supplier's mechanic's lien and awarding 
prejudgment interest. Again, the owner argued the claim was 
unliquidated. The Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed, noting "this 
was a liquidated claim because it was and is susceptible of 
calculation by reference to the contract and the invoices." Id. at 
781. 
Utah also recognizes the propriety of prejudgment interest in 
the construction context. In Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah 
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Ct. App. 1987), this Court affirmed an award of prejudgment 
interest in favor of a contractor and against an owner. Although 
no enforceable contract existed between the parties, the Court 
allowed recovery on a quantum meruit theory and decided prejudgment 
interest should be awarded from the "date that defendants 
acknowledged an obligation to pay plaintiffs . . . ." Id. at 270. 
See Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P. 2d 1298, 1301 
(Utah 1982) (holding the "general rule for prejudgment interest in 
Utah is that an unpaid subcontractor (materialman) is entitled to 
interest from the contractor when the last materials have been 
furnished and the payment therefor is past due."). 
The common element in these cases is the ability of the court 
to set the damages by reference to facts and figures and 
mathematical calculations. While the trial court is entitled to 
some discretion as to which facts and figures it will accept, the 
decision of the trial court is still based upon those facts and 
figures, and not some discretionary or subjective standard. 
In this case, the trial court determined the amount of its 
award by reference to the evidence offered by Nuttall on the amount 
due, and the evidence offered by North on offsets and overcharges. 
The starting point for the court's calculation was the amount due 
at the time North breached the parties' agreement. The damage was 
complete and the loss fixed on a particular date, with damages 
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calculable based on facts and figures. Prejudgment interest should 
have been awarded. The trial court erred in reaching a contrary-
conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
North's appeal represents nothing more than an attempt to 
rehash and reargue the facts. The defendant has given no attention 
to the requirement to marshall the evidence. If a proper 
recitation of the facts and evidence had been presented it would be 
apparent that the trial court was well within its bounds to enter 
judgment in favor of plaintiff. North's appeal should be denied. 
Under the controlling law, prejudgment interest is appropriate 
and should be awarded. To deny prejudgment interest on the basis 
that it was "disputed" gives to every debtor the right to avoid his 
just debts by simply claiming that he does not agree with the 
amount owed. Accordingly, the matter should be remanded to the 
trial court with instructions to award prejudgment interest from 
the date of recording of the lien. 
Under Utah statute a contractor is entitled to recover 
attorneys' fees on a foreclosure action. Nuttall has been required 
to defend this matter, yet again, before this Court. The fees 
expended by Nuttall on appeal were as necessary to the result as 
were the fees expended at trial. This Court should remand this 
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matter for further proceedings before the trial court including the 
entry of additional attorneys' fees. 
DATED this day of November, 1995. 
DART,/ADAJVIS0N & DONOVAN 
CRAIG G. ADAMSON 
DUANE R. SMITH 
ERIC P. LEE 
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